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Abstract
Image repurposing is a commonly used method for spread-
ing misinformation on social media and online forums, which
involves publishing untampered images with modified meta-
data to create rumors and further propaganda. While man-
ual verification is possible, given vast amounts of verified
knowledge available on the internet, the increasing preva-
lence and ease of this form of semantic manipulation call
for the development of robust automatic ways of assessing
the semantic integrity of multimedia data. In this paper, we
present a novel method for image repurposing detection that
is based on the real-world adversarial interplay between
a bad actor who repurposes images with counterfeit meta-
data and a watchdog who verifies the semantic consistency
between images and their accompanying metadata, where
both players have access to a reference dataset of verified
content, which they can use to achieve their goals. The
proposed method exhibits state-of-the-art performance on
location-identity, subject-identity and painting-artist verifi-
cation, showing its efficacy across a diverse set of scenarios.
1. Introduction
The internet-driven information age, in which we are cur-
rently living, has seen rapid advances in technology that
have made creation and transmission of information on a
large-scale increasingly easier. Consequently, the manner in
which people consume information has evolved from printed
media and cable-television to digital sources. Simultane-
ously, social networking platforms have evolved to make it
easier for people to disseminate information quickly within
communities and publicly. This provides an excellent way
for people to share news quickly, making social media a pop-
ular news source, especially among the youth [17]. However,
this ease of information propagation has also made social
networks a popular mode of transmission of fake news.
Given the potency of falsified information propagating
on the internet, several activist groups have launched crowd-
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Figure 1: Image repurposing in different domains from real exam-
ples – (a) lookalike1, (b) incorrect location2, (c) wrongly-claimed
artist3. Unmanipulated images are often reused in this way to
spread misinformation about a similar yet different entity or event.
sourced efforts (such as Snopes4) towards debunking fake
news. However, the sheer volume and rate at which informa-
tion is being created and disseminated necessitate developing
automated ways of validating information. Several methods
have, hence, been developed recently for detecting rumors
on online forums [5, 11, 14, 16, 27, 23], digital manipula-
tions of images [3, 28, 29, 30], and semantic inconsistencies
in multimedia data [8, 24]. While the detection of digital
manipulation has gained most of the research attention over
the years, rumor detection and semantic integrity verification
are much newer areas of research.
1https://twitter.com/jfnyc1/status/1043665540580081669
2https://twitter.com/tachirense89/status/434844811548311552
3https://bit.ly/2QLJjaC
4www.snopes.com
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In this paper, we focus on detecting image repurposing —
a form of semantic manipulation of multimedia data where
untampered images are reused in combination with falsified
metadata to spread misinformation. Figure 1 shows some
real-world examples of image repurposing. Jaiswal et al. [8]
define the broader problem of multimedia semantic integrity
assessment as the verification of consistency between the
media asset (e.g. image) and different components of the
associated metadata (e.g. text caption, geo-location, etc.),
since the asset and the metadata are expected to be a co-
herent package. They also introduce the concept of using a
reference dataset (RD) of untampered packages to assist the
validation of query packages. Image repurposing detection
falls under this umbrella and has been explored in packages
of images and captions [8] as well as those that additionally
contain Global Positioning System (GPS) information [24].
The method proposed in [8] for integrity assessment de-
tects inconsistencies in packages with entire captions poten-
tially copied from other packages at random. Sabir et al. [24],
on the other hand, present a method for the detection of ma-
nipulations of named entities within captions. However, the
MEIR dataset proposed and evaluated on in [24] falls short
on the deceptive potential of entity-manipulations because
they are implemented as randomly swapping the entity in a
given caption with the same class of entity (person, organi-
zation, or location) from a caption in an unrelated package.
One of the main challenges for developing image repur-
posing detection methods is the lack of training and evalu-
ation data. While crowd sourcing is a potential alternative,
it is expensive, and time consuming. In light of this, we
propose a novel framework for image repurposing detection,
which can be trained in the absence of training data con-
taining manipulated metadata. The proposed framework,
which we call Adversarial Image Repurposing Detection
(AIRD), is modeled to simulate the real-world adversarial
interplay between a bad actor who repurposes images with
counterfeit metadata and a watchdog who verifies the se-
mantic consistency between images and their accompanying
metadata. More specifically, AIRD consists of two models: a
counterfeiter and a detector, which are trained adversarially.
Following the approach of previous works, the proposed
framework employs a reference dataset of unmanipulated
packages as a source of world knowledge. While the detec-
tor gathers evidence from the reference set, the counterfeiter
exploits it to conjure convincingly deceptive fake metadata
for a given query package. The proposed framework can
be applied to all forms of metadata. However, since gen-
erating natural language text is an open research problem,
the experimental evaluation is performed on structured meta-
data. Furthermore, previous methods on image repurposing
detection focus only on entity manipulations within cap-
tions. Hence, AIRD could be employed in such cases by
first extracting entities using named entity recognition. The
proposed framework exhibits state-of-the-art performance
on the Google Landmarks dataset [22] for location-identity
verification, a variant of the IJB-C dataset [21], called IJBC-
IRD, which we created for subject-identity verification, and
the Painter by Numbers dataset [1] for painting-artist verifi-
cation. Results on this diverse collection of datasets, which
we make publicly available5, illustrate the generalization
capability of the proposed model.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• a novel approach to image repurposing detection that is
modeled to simulate the real-world adversarial interplay
between nefarious actors and watchdogs
• a new framework design that can be adopted in devel-
oping real-world image repurposing detection systems
that utilize knowledge-bases to validate information
• the IJBC-IRD dataset of face images with subject-
identity metadata, created to further research in the
area of face-image repurposing detection
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. In Section 3 we describe the pro-
posed framework. Results of experimental evaluation are
provided in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper and
discuss future directions in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Detection of fake news and rumors on online platforms
has been studied in the research domain of rumor detection
through automated analysis of textual content [5, 14, 16],
propagation of posts within communities [11, 27], and the
kind of response they elicit from people [23]. These works
are not targeted at image-based manipulations of information
and do not incorporate any form of image analysis in their
methodology of information verification.
Detection of digital manipulations in images has been
studied extensively in the past for image-splicing, copy-
move forgery, resampling and retouching of images at the
pixel-level [3, 28, 29, 30]. These methods work by either
verifying embedded watermarks within images or analyzing
pixel-level consistencies in search for artifacts.
The reuse of unmanipulated images to spread misinforma-
tion about a possibly unrelated entity or event was introduced
in [8] as the verification of semantic integrity of data with
image assets. Image repurposing with manipulated textual
and location data has been studied more specifically in [24].
Our work falls in this category and we propose a novel gen-
eralized framework for image repurposing detection.
Adversarial learning has been employed recently for im-
proving object detection [31], disentangled feature learn-
ing [9, 15] and feature augmentation [25], besides data gener-
ation [6, 7]. The proposed AIRD framework uses adversarial
5www.github.com/isi-vista/AIRD-Datasets
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Figure 2: Adversarial Image Repurposing Detection (AIRD) — At
the core of this framework are two adversarially trained models:
the Counterfeiter C and the Detector D. Reference Dataset (RD)
is a collection of verified images and metadata representing world
knowledge. Variants of i and m are used to denote images and
metadata, respectively. Similarly, variants of IR and MR denote
collections of retrieved images and metadata, respectively. While
the Metadata Generator (MG) of C takes advantage of RD to conjure
fake metadata for an image by analyzing that of other similar images
of different entities or events, the Consistency Verifier (CV) of D
uses evidence gathered from the RD to assess the veracity of the
claimed metadata presented with the query image.
learning to model the real-life interplay between malicious
actors and watchdogs for image repurposing detection.
3. Adversarial Image Repurposing Detection
Jaiswal et al. [8] introduced the general approach of us-
ing a reference dataset of packages as a knowledge-base
from which evidence could be gathered, to assist the seman-
tic integrity assessment of a query package. Conceptually,
this approach is similar to how watchdogs verify news arti-
cles online, with news sources, document repositories and
encyclopedias on the internet serving as enormous refer-
ence datasets. However, in the real-world, these datasets
are accessible to nefarious actors too. In the case of image-
repurposing, reference datasets are exploited in order to find
images that can serve as fake evidences for rumors and propa-
ganda. Thus, both counterfeiters and watchdogs have access
to the same information but one group uses it for spreading
misinformation while other employs it for information vali-
dation. The presented view of this key observation reveals
an inherent informed adversarial interplay between the two
groups. We propose the Adversarial Image Repurposing
Detection (AIRD) framework that models this interplay.
The proposed AIRD framework consists of two com-
peting models — (1) a counterfeiter (C), which uses the
reference dataset to fabricate metadata for untampered im-
ages, and (2) a detector (D), which gathers evidence from
the reference dataset to verify the semantic integrity of query
packages. While the working mechanism of the detector
network is close to that of real-world watchdogs, we model
the counterfeiter as an extremely malevolent person who
wishes to repurpose all available images with the sole inten-
tion of spreading as much misinformation as possible. At the
core of the counterfeiter model is a metadata-generator (MG)
neural network, while the detector contains a consistency-
verifier (CV) network. The parameters of these networks are
learned through adversarial training. The models (C & D)
employ semantic encoding and retrieval tools to fetch addi-
tional packages from the reference set for their individual
goals. Figure 2 shows the high-level design of the proposed
framework. We describe the components of AIRD including
implementation and training details in the following sections.
3.1. Encoding and Retrieval from Reference Dataset
Modality-specific encoders: The counterfeiter and de-
tector models in the proposed framework gather informa-
tion through retrieval of additional similar and/or related
packages from the reference dataset. In order to facil-
itate meaningful retrieval of information, it is important
to encode each modality of the multimedia packages into
information-rich semantic representations. Ideally, these
encoders would be trained end-to-end with the metadata-
generator and consistency-verifier networks, so that each
can extract very specific information and learn similarity
between data instances in order to help it achieve its goal.
For example, in the case of packages containing images and
captions, both MG and CV would have their own copies of
image and text encoders that would be trained end-to-end
with them. However, this is not always feasible because the
entire reference set, which is enormous in size, would have
to be re-indexed every time the parameters of these encoders
are updated for complex modalities like images and text.
The proposed framework employs pretrained modality-
specific encoders that are not updated during the adversarial
training, when such situations arise. It is crucial to carefully
select these encoders such that the embeddings generated by
them capture all details of information that is vulnerable to
manipulation. Thus, an ideal system would use image and
text encoders that capture fine-grained semantic details in
images and captions, in our example above. As discussed
earlier, the proposed framework is evaluated on packages
containing images and highly-specific structured metadata.
Hence, we employ off-the-shelf yet state-of-the-art deep
neural networks trained externally to detect those metadata
as image encoders. In contrast, the metadata encoders are
learned jointly with the adversarial training of MG and CV,
such that the models can learn to cluster the metadata values
by similarity in the embedding space. In the rest of the paper,
we denote the encodings of image and metadata (whether
natural language or structured) as i and m, respectively.
Indexing and retrieval from the reference dataset: Re-
trieval of additional related information from the reference
dataset based on structured metadata is naturally imple-
mented as database querying. Contrarily, data modalities
like images and text have to be first encoded into vector
representations. Retrieving related packages can then be per-
formed through a nearest neighbor search. However, in the
case of semantic integrity assessment, the reference dataset
is expected to be enormous in size, especially in real world-
cases, where it is expected to contain possibly all validated
knowledge about the world. Using a brute-force nearest
neighbor search, therefore, becomes impractical.
In order to develop a scalable framework for image repur-
posing detection, we employ efficient approximate search
methods for similarity-based querying of reference datasets
that have been shown to work on databases of billions of
records. Furthermore, to boost the accuracy of the approx-
imation, we use a cascaded indexing mechanism. The
high-level stages of the system are — (1) indexing using
a Reranked Product Quantization-based Inverted File Index
(IVFPQ+R) [10], followed by (2) additional re-ranking of
approximate retrievals using exact cosine similarities. We
use efficient implementations of these indexing modules
publicly available in the faiss6 package.
3.2. Counterfeiter Model C
The working mechanism of C is shown in the upper-half
of Figure 2 and is described as follows.
Fake candidates: The non-parametric component of C
aims to find plausible misleading candidates. In order to
repurpose an image (encoded as i) by manipulating its meta-
data (m), the counterfeiter first queries the reference dataset
for the K-most similar images with dissimilar metadata.
The encodings of these images are collectively denoted as
IRi . Similarly, their accompanying metadata is denoted as
MRi . Given the characteristics of modality-specific encoders
described in Section 3.1, this results in K images that could
be confused for the original with respect to the metadata to
be manipulated. For instance, if the image of a person’s face
were to be repurposed as someone else’s by manipulating the
subject-identity metadata, such a retrieval would result in K
face images whose subjects look very similar to the original
subject. We call these retrieved packages fake candidates.
Metadata Generator: The fake candidates as well as the
original image and metadata are then passed on to the
metadata generator neural network (MG). While caption-
metadata is already encoded using a pretrained encoder (as
6www.github.com/facebookresearch/faiss
described above), in the case of structured metadata, MG first
encodes it using a metadata encoder that is trained as a part of
MG. MG contains a candidacy-scorer sub-network (CSSN;
implemented using two fully-connected layers), which then
scores each of the K candidates by comparing it with the
original image-metadata pair, as shown in Equation 1:
sk = CSSN((i,m), (ik,mk)), (1)
where ik and mk denote the k-th package in {IRi , MRi }.
Finally, scores of the candidates are converted into a
choice distribution (c) through an attention-like softmax op-
eration. In order to make the choices sharp, softmax is used
with a low temperature, where softmax with temperature,
as used in reinforcement learning for converting values into
action-decisions, is described in Equation 2.
ck = exp (sk/τ)∑Kj=1 exp (sj/τ) ; τ ∈ (0,1] (2)
The choice distribution is multiplied element-wise with
the metadata of the fake candidates. MG then produces the
fabricated metadata as the sum of these weighted candidate
metadata. Since the choice distribution is sharp, this simu-
lates the act of choosing one of the K metadata values while
still retaining differentiability. The fabricated metadata is,
thus, computed as described in Equation 3.
m̃ = K∑
k=1 ck ⋅mk (3)
3.3. Detector Model D
The lower-half of Figure 2 provides an overview of the
working mechanism of D. It is described as follows.
Gathering evidence: The manual process of gathering
evidence from reference datasets and using them to validate
query packages inspires the design of the detector model
(D) in the proposed AIRD framework. The detector starts
with retrieving K-most similar packages from the reference
dataset, using both the image (ˆi) and the associated metadata
(m̂) as the query modality independently. Thus, it gathers
two sets of evidence, which can be broken down into image
encodings and metadata as {IR
iˆ
,MR
iˆ
} and {IRm̂,MRm̂} for
image-based and metadata-based retrievals, respectively.
Consistency Verifier: The next step in the semantic in-
tegrity verification is to use these sets of evidence in com-
bination with the query package for validation. This is per-
formed by the consistency verifier neural network (CV). Just
like MG, CV starts with first encoding the metadata, if it
is structured, using the same encoder that MG uses. This
allows for the encoding and semantics of metadata to be
consistent across MG and CV. The CV network performs
within-modality combination of query and retrieved encod-
ings followed by cross-modality combination of informa-
tion in order to assess the semantic integrity of the query
package. Within-modality combination of encodings is de-
signed as Siamese networks [13], with the replicated mod-
ules termed as aggregators (Agg) and implemented using
two fully-connected neural layers. The cross-modal combi-
nation is designed as the concatenation of modality-specific
information aggregates followed by a fully-connected layer.
The combined information is then used to make an integrity
judgement using a final fully-connected layer. This process
is illustrated by Equations 4–11.
hiimg = Aggimg(ˆi, IRiˆ ) (4)
hmimg = Aggimg(ˆi, IRm̂) (5)
himeta = Aggmeta(m̂,MRiˆ ) (6)
hmmeta = Aggmeta(m̂,MRm̂) (7)
himg = relu (WTimg[hiimg,hmimg] + bimg) (8)
hmeta = relu (WTmeta[himeta,hmmeta] + bmeta) (9)
hcross = relu (WTcross[himg,hmeta] + bcross) (10)
y = σ (WTyhcross + by) (11)
3.4. Training AIRD
The metadata generator and the consistency verifier net-
works are trained adversarially using the objective described
in Equation 12 in a simplified notation wherein i denotes an
image and m its real metadata.
max
CV
min
MG
J(CV,MG) = E [logCV(i,m)]+E [log(1 −CV(i,MG(i,m)))] (12)
As mentioned earlier, in the case of structured metadata,
the parameters of the metadata encoder are also learned
jointly. However, in order to keep the training stable and the
encodings consistent, the parameters of this encoder do not
receive gradients directly from CV. This puts CV at a slight
disadvantage by design, which encourages it to become more
robust. As reflected in Equation 13, CV is trained with real
image-metadata pairs besides images with MG-generated
metadata. We train the CV with two additional fake-cases,
as well — (1) (i,mr) – image with randomly sampled fake
metadata, which we call easy-negatives, and (2) (i,mc) –
image with the metadata of the most similar image-based
retrieval from RD, such that mc ≠m, called hard-negatives.
The complete training objective is shown in Equation 13.
max
CV
min
MG
J(CV,MG)= E [logCV(i,m)] +E [log(1 −CV(i,MG(i,m)))]+E [log(1 −CV(i,mc))] +E [log(1 −CV(i,mr))] (13)
4. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the datasets on which AIRD
was evaluated, report the performance of the indexing sys-
tem, provide examples of fake candidates to validate that
convincing image-repurposing is indeed possible for these
datasets, describe the baseline and state-of-the-art models
that AIRD is compared with, and report experimental results.
4.1. Benchmark Datasets
The proposed AIRD framework was evaluated on three
diverse datasets containing specific forms of identifying
metadata that are vulnerable to manipulation for image-
repurposing, viz., the Google Landmarks dataset of land-
mark images containing location information in the form
of landmark-identity, the IJBC-IRD dataset of face images
containing subject-identity information, and the Painter by
Numbers dataset of paintings with artist-identity metadata.
Details of these datasets are provided as follows.
Google Landmarks: This dataset [22] was released by
Google for a Kaggle competition on recognizing location-
landmarks from images. It is the largest worldwide dataset
of images of landmarks annotated with their identity. We
use this dataset for the detection of image-repurposing with
location-identity manipulation, i.e., verification that the im-
age is indeed from the claimed location. The dataset consists
of 1,225,029 images spanning 14,951 different landmarks.
The distribution of images across landmarks is imbalanced,
with some landmarks having as low as one image while
others having as high as 50,000 images. The dataset was
filtered to remove landmarks with less than five images,
which resulted in a total of 1,216,589 images of 13,885 land-
marks. The images were encoded using a publicly available
pretrained NetVLAD [2] model7, which was designed and
trained for place recognition, followed by dimensionality
reduction with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
L2-normalization, as prescribed in [2].
IJBC-IRD: The IARPA Janus Benchmark C (IJB-C) [21]8
dataset is a novel face recognition benchmark. It has tough
variability with face imagery presenting a wide range of
poses, harsh illuminations, occlusions, aging and other chal-
lenging conditions. For all these reasons, the series IJB–
{A,B,C} [12, 26, 21] quickly became the de facto standard
for face recognition in the wild.
With these motivations, seeking realistic scenarios for
face repurposing detection, we selected a subset of IJB-C to
create a new benchmark, dubbed “IJB-C Image Repurposing
Detection” (IJBC-IRD). IJBC-IRD shares the same media
as IJB-C but focuses on the subjects that are more likely to
be used for face identity repurposing. To do so, we favored
7www.di.ens.fr/willow/research/netvlad/
8www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-challenges
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Figure 3: Examples of image-based retrievals used by D. The first column shows the query image and the following three are the top-3
retrievals. Each image is titled with its real metadata-identity. Correct retrievals are shown with green borders and incorrect ones with red.
subjects with ample intra-class variations (picking individ-
uals with at least five media from the IJB-C metadata) and
only considering still images, thus discarding all the motion
frames. We motivate the use of still images, since we argue
that clean, good quality images serve better for the face re-
purposing task – frames from videos usually contain motion
blur and lack of discriminative facial features, making the
impersonification of a subject less believable.
The IJBC-IRD dataset contains 16,377 images spanning
1,649 subjects. We employ a state-of-the-art face recognition
system to encode face images by following the procedure
of [19, 20]. We chose this system for its performance and
for its pose-invariance capability [18]. The face encoder
is a single convolutional neural network based on a deep
residual architecture, following the same training procedure
described in [4]. Faces are encoded using the activations of
the penultimate layer and the descriptors are decorrelated
via PCA and signed square rooting. The final encoding for
an image is the result of average-pooling estimated views
rendered at different angles with the original 2D aligned
image. In general, we use the same recognition pipeline
from [4] and we refer to that for more details.
Painter by Numbers: This dataset [1] was created for a
Kaggle competition to determine whether pairs of paintings
belonged to the same artist, in order to develop technologies
for detecting art forgeries. We use this dataset to evaluate
the detection of image repurposing where a painting’s artist-
ownership has been manipulated, i.e., detecting whether
the painting was indeed painted by the claimed artist. The
dataset contains 103,250 images from 2,319 different artists.
Just like previous cases, this dataset is imbalanced with fre-
quency ranging from one painting to 500 paintings per artist.
The dataset was filtered to pick images of paintings of the top
1,000 most frequent artists in the dataset resulting in 72,863
paintings. The images were encoded using the model9 that
won the competition, followed by L2-normalization.
All datasets were split into training and testing sets con-
taining 80% and 20% images, respectively, using stratified
sampling. The training splits of the datasets were also addi-
tionally used as reference datasets in all the experiments. All
possible retrievals in the form of fake candidates for the coun-
terfeiter and evidence for the detector were precomputed in
order to speed up the training process.
4.2. Indexing and Retrieval Performance
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c show qualitative results of image-
based retrievals for the Google Landmarks, IJBC-IRD and
Painter by Numbers datasets, respectively. In each of these
figures, the first column shows query images, followed by the
top three image-based retrievals from the reference dataset.
In the figures, we use green borders to show cases where the
metadata of the retrieved image matches that of the query
and red ones to show cases where it does not. The results
show that the retrieval system returns images that are very
similar to the query image, with usually the same metadata.
However, it also makes mistakes sometimes when there are
very similar images in the reference dataset that have dissim-
ilar metadata. This can be attributed to the cascading effect
of errors in the semantic encoding of images followed by
approximation errors in the nearest neighbor search.
9www.github.com/inejc/painters
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Figure 4: Examples of fake-candidates used by C. The first column shows the query image and the following three are fake-candidates.
Table 1: Performance of image-based retrieval in similar search of
images with the same metadata value. Metrics are reported only for
K=3, which is the number of packages retrieved in our experiments.
GL stands for Google Landmarks and PbN for Painter by Numbers.
Metric GL IJBC-IRD PbN
MAP@3 0.8127 0.8396 0.6147
Precision@3 0.8404 0.8537 0.6326
The Mean Average Precision at K (MAP@K) and Preci-
sion at K (Precision@K) with respect to accurate matching
of metadata between query and retrieved images are reported
in Table 1 to quantify the performance of the retrieval sys-
tem on the aforementioned datasets. The results show that
the retrieval performance is the best on IJBC-IRD, followed
closely by Google Landmarks and relatively lower on Painter
by Numbers, which is an especially challenging dataset be-
cause its metadata (the painting’s artist) is more subtle than
that of the other datasets (subject or location identity).
4.3. Fake Candidates for Counterfeiter
The success of the proposed AIRD framework and the
adversarial training, more specifically, relies on the ability
of the counterfeiter to find convincing fake candidates. We
present samples of fake candidates used by C for the Google
Landmarks, IJBC-IRD, and Painter by Numbers datasets in
Figures 4a, 4b and 4c, respectively. The first column of each
of these figures shows the image selected by the counter-
feiter to repurpose. The following three columns show fake
candidates. The results show that these datasets contain very
convincing similar images with dissimilar metadata such that
one could be confused for the other. It is also important to
note that in real cases of image repurposing, the audience
does not see the query image (the first column) as a part of
the information package (e.g., a fake news article) but only
one of the fake candidates. This makes it easy to fool people.
4.4. Baseline and State-of-the-Art Models
The proposed AIRD framework is designed to make ad-
ditional information available to the detector in the form of
retrieval from the reference dataset. However, this setup also
allows for the development of several non-learning methods
involving direct comparison of query and retrieved packages
using similarity metrics to make integrity assessments. We
discuss these models below and use them as baselines for
comparing the proposed AIRD framework with:
• B1 – similarity between query metadata and that of
query-image-based retrievals from the reference dataset
• B2 – similarity between query image and images re-
trieved from the reference dataset using query metadata
• B3 – similarity between images retrieved using query
image and those retrieved using query metadata
• B4 – similarity between metadata of query-image-
based retrievals and those retrieved using metadata
Another method of metadata validation is the use of a
metadata-predictor (MP) model. Given a query image and
its metadata, MP first predicts the metadata for the image
and then matches it with the claimed metadata. If the two
match, MP tags the query package as valid.
Previous works in this domain [8, 24] focused on the de-
tection of metadata modalities that are continuous in nature,
such as captions and GPS coordinates in the form of latent
encodings. The method of [8] is not suitable for structured
metadata because it relies on learning a joint representation
of images and captions. The publicly available deep multi-
task model (DMM) of [24]10 was evaluated and we report the
scores of this model on the IJBC-IRD and Painter by Num-
bers datasets. The package-similarity based retrieval used in
their framework was not feasible on the Google Landmarks
datasets, which has 1.2 million images. Hence, DMM could
not be evaluated on this dataset.
In addition, a non-adversarial version of AIRD is eval-
uated as an ablation study. We call this model the non-
adversarial detector (NAD). NAD is trained with real image-
metadata pairs along with (i,mr) and (i,mc) for easy and
hard negatives, respectively, as described in Section 3.4.
4.5. Results
In order to evaluate the proposed framework and the afore-
mentioned models, we use K = 3, i.e., both the counterfeiter
and the detector retrieve three packages from the RD as fake
candidates and evidence, respectively. The similarity thresh-
old for making decisions with the non-learning baseline
models B1, B2 and B3 were tuned on the training dataset.
The datasets used in the experimental evaluation contain
structured metadata. Hence, B4 was not evaluated because
it reduces to B1. MP was implemented as a three-layer
fully connected neural network trained with the same encod-
ings that AIRD was trained on, which were generated using
dedicated deep neural networks as described in Section 4.1.
Following the approach of previous works [8, 24], F1-
tampered (F1-tamp; calculated by treating y = fake as the
positive class), F1-clean (calculated with y = real as the
positive class), and Area Under Receiver Operating Curve
(AUC) were used to quantify the performance of the models.
We also report the accuracy scores (ACC) as an additional
metric of model performance. All the models were tested on
real image-metadata pairs as well as (i,mr) pairs of images
with randomly sampled fake metadata, following the evalu-
ation methodology of previous works [8, 24]. The models
were additionally evaluated on hard-negatives (i,mc).
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present results of the experiments. The
results show that the proposed AIRD framework outperforms
all other models on all metrics. While the non-adversarial
detector (NAD) performs better than other baseline models,
its performance is inferior to the complete AIRD. This ad-
ditional boost in performance is, therefore, credited to the
adversarial training of the detector with the counterfeiter.
The proposed framework outperforms the prior state-of-the-
art DMM model by a large margin, showing that DMM is
not suitable for the case of image repurposing where the
metadata comprises structured identity information.
10www.github.com/Ekraam/MEIR
Table 2: Evaluation Results on Google Landmarks Dataset.
Metric B1(B4) B2 B3 MP NAD AIRD
F1-tamp 0.91 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.95
F1-clean 0.81 0.37 0.39 0.87 0.90 0.91
ACC 0.86 0.72 0.71 0.88 0.90 0.94
AUC 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.94 0.95 0.98
Table 3: Evaluation Results on IJBC-IRD Dataset.
Metric B1(B4) B2 B3 MP DMM NAD AIRD
F1-tamp 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.50 0.93 0.95
F1-clean 0.83 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.72 0.86 0.89
ACC 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.65 0.90 0.93
AUC 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.76 0.95 0.97
Table 4: Evaluation Results on Painter by Numbers Dataset.
Metric B1(B4) B2 B3 MP DMM NAD AIRD
F1-tamp 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.22 0.82 0.83
F1-clean 0.46 0.16 0.18 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.68
ACC 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.51 0.76 0.77
AUC 0.61 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.53 0.80 0.84
5. Conclusion
We presented a novel framework for image repurposing
detection that is modeled after the real-world adversarial
interplay between nefarious actors who spread misinforma-
tion and watchdogs who verify information. The proposed
framework is composed of a counterfeiter and a detector,
which are trained adversarially. Like real-world, both the
models have access to world knowledge through retrieval of
information from a reference dataset, which they use to their
advantage. We described the model components along with
the training strategy. The framework was evaluated on the
Google Landmarks dataset with location-identiy, IJBC-IRD
with subject-identity and Painter by Numbers dataset with
painting-artist as metadata. Results show that the proposed
framework outperforms all baseline models and prior state-
of-the-art on all metrics on a diverse collection of datasets.
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